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Using a panel Vector Auto-Regression (panel VAR) of nine of the OECD’s 
major oil-importing countries and Reinhart and Rogoff’s de facto 
classification of exchange rate regimes, we find support for the hypothesis that 
flexible exchange regimes better absorb oil-price shocks.  The price level, 
output, and the real exchange rate exhibit smoother adjustment to their long-
run equilibrium when the de facto exchange rate regime was flexible.  We also 
document feedback from the real effective exchange rate and inflation rate to 
the domestic-currency real oil price shock, supporting the growing notion that 
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1. Introduction  
One of the main arguments in favor of flexible exchange rate regimes has been 
the ability of flexible regimes to insulate the economy from real external 
shocks that require adjustment in relative prices among countries.  This 
argument dates back to Friedman (1953): assuming that prices and wages are 
sticky (or move slowly), it is better to allow the nominal exchange rate to 
make the necessary adjustment to a real shock that requires the adjustment of 
the real exchange rate among countries,  instead of waiting for a prolonged 
adjustment through excess demand in the goods and labor markets to push 
prices and wages to the new equilibrium.  Many countries adopted flexible 
exchange rates after 1973, just prior to the series of oil price shocks that hit 
most industrialized economies.  
 Although the proposition that flexible exchange rate regimes cushion 
the economy against external real shocks had been given a rigorous theoretical 
foundation by both Keynesian and new open-economy macroeconomics, the 
stabilizing role of flexible exchange rate regimes has recently received less 
support empirically.  First, due to their extensive fluctuations, nominal 
exchange rates show a “disconnect” from their economic fundamentals, which 
fluctuate much less than exchange rates (e.g. Mussa (1986), Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1998), and others).  Second, recent evidence gives little support for 
the “expenditure switching” mechanism through which flexible exchange rate 
regimes insulate real output from adverse real effects.  More specifically, the 
empirical evidence shows a low pass-through from nominal exchange rates to 
domestic prices, (Engel (2002, 2000, 1999), Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001), 
and many other contributions).1  The evidence adds to the growing notion that 
the role of a flexible exchange rate regime in cushioning the economy against 
adverse real shocks is overstated since changes in the nominal exchange rate 
do not translate into substantial changes in relative prices of goods among 
countries.   
The recent studies that test Friedman’s hypothesis have concentrated 
on the effect of terms-of-trade shocks on real output under alternative 
exchange rate regimes (Broda (2004), and Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2003)).  
Broda (2004) investigates the response of real GDP, real exchange rates, and 
prices to terms-of-trade shocks across different exchange regimes using a 
sample of 75 developing countries for the period 1973-96 and the de facto 
regime classification of Ghosh et al. (1997).  He finds a significant difference 
across regimes with the flexible regimes being able to buffer the shocks better 
than the fixed regimes, as argued by Friedman (1953).  Broda also finds the 
real exchange rate adjustment to be more persistent in flexible regimes than in 
fixed regimes when negative shocks hit and no significant difference when 
positive shocks hit.   Concentrating only on output growth, Edwards and Levy-
Yeyati (2003) also examine the impact of the terms-of-trade shocks under 
alternative exchange rate regimes.  Using a sample of annual observations of 
100 countries (both developed and developing) over the period 1974-2000 and 
                                                 
1 For the recent theoretical and empirical developments in this literature see Engel 
(2002) 
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the de facto regime classification of Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
they find support for Friedman’s theoretical proposition that “countries with 
flexible exchange rates are able to better accommodate real external shocks”.   
In this paper, we use oil price shocks instead of the terms-of-trade 
shocks to examine the insulating property of flexible exchange rates.  Oil price 
shocks have occurred several times and have  hit all economies in the world 
since World War II.  Given the re-occurrence of oil price shocks, one might 
wonder, what monetary and exchange rate systems might facilitate the 
absorption of these shocks?   
We argue that oil price shocks are more appropriate for tests of 
Friedman’s hypothesis than are terms-of-trade fluctuations.   This is because, 
in the short-run, fluctuations in the terms-of-trade might come from real and 
nominal shocks.  For example, a reduction in the money supply by the Federal 
Reserve might affect the world economy and hence the terms-of-trade.   In this 
case, one cannot robustly test for the insulation property of flexible exchange 
rate regimes since the sources of the shock are not confidently known and the 
exogeneity assumption cannot be safely assumed. Furthermore, the use of 
terms-of-trade fluctuations to study the adjustment behavior of the economy 
for different exchange rate regimes may be subject to the Lucas Critique.  This 
is because certain shocks that affect the terms-of-trade occur under one 
exchange rate regime and might not be observable under others.  There is, 
however, no reason to believe that oil price shocks are different across 
exchange rate regimes.  Moreover, as indicated above, there is growing 
support for the argument that the degree of exchange rate pass-through is not 
the same across different exchange rate regimes.  Thus, for the same source of 
disturbance, the changes in the terms-of-trade will not be the same across 
different exchange rate regimes. On the other hand, as documented by a 
number of studies, oil prices have been the dominant factor causing persistent 
movements in the terms-of-trade (see Backus and Crucini (2000), and Amano 
and Van Norden (1996)).   
 Since the channels of influence of oil price shocks may be many, a 
well-structured empirical model that robustly accounts for all channels might 
not be attainable.  To bypass such an obstacle, we use a panel VAR technique, 
with minimal restrictions, to test for the impact of oil price shocks on nine 
major OECD oil-importing countries under alternative exchange rate regimes, 
after controlling for other factors that might affect the responsiveness to oil 
price shocks.  We use quarterly observations from 1973Q1 to 2004Q2 for 
Japan, Germany, France, Italy, South Korea (Korea), Spain, Portugal, Sweden, 
and Finland.2  The endogenous variables of the panel VAR are: the real oil 
price shocks, the bilateral real exchange rate with the US, a measure of 
monetary policy, real output growth, and the inflation rate.    
   We find that flexible exchange rate regimes better absorb positive oil 
price shocks, consistent with Friedman’s hypothesis.  The necessary 
adjustments are borne by the nominal exchange rate, mostly in the same 
period of the oil price shocks.  We find that under flexible exchange rate 
                                                 
2 The observations for the members of the European Union covers only the period 
1973Q1-1998Q4. 
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regimes the responses to  positive oil price shocks of the real exchange rate, 
the inflation rate, and output growth show faster speeds of adjustment when 
returning to their long-run equilibriums than under fixed exchange rate 
regimes.  In addition, the inflation rate shows a higher contemporaneous 
increase due to positive oil shocks under fixed exchange regimes.  Our results 
show that monetary policy reactions to the oil price shocks make no 
significant contribution to the response of the real exchange rate, output 
growth, and the inflation rate following oil price shocks.  These findings have 
policy implications for emerging economies as they experience a growing 
industrial sector and more dependence on imported oil. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
role of the exchange rate regime in transmitting oil price shocks to the 
economy.  Section 3 presents the econometric techniques.  Section 4 discusses 
the results and robustness.  Section 5 gives our conclusions.    
 
2. How Might Exchange Rate Regimes Play a Role in the Effects of Oil 
Price Shocks? 
 
The literature on oil price shocks and the macroeconomy has not paid any 
specific attention to the role of exchange rate regimes.  As discussed by Jones, 
Leiby, and Paik (2004) in their extensive review, this literature has four 
strands: a) the microeconomic channels and the resource reallocations of oil 
price shocks; b) the portions of the recessions that are explained by either oil 
price shocks and/or by monetary policy responses to these shocks; c) the 
nature and stability of the relationship between oil price shocks and GDP; and 
finally d) the estimation of the magnitude of the effect of an oil price shock on 
GDP.   In an open economy, we can think of three inter-related channels 
through which the exchange rate regime plays a role in the effects of oil-price 
shocks.  The first channel is the direct channel, in which oil price shocks affect 
the nominal exchange rate of a country with the US dollar.  This channel is 
relevant for countries with flexible exchange rate regimes.  The country will 
be directly affected by oil-price shocks through the domestic currency prices 
of imported oil.  Given that oil sales are denominated in US dollars, there is no 
clear theory that explains the effect of oil price shocks on the bilateral nominal 
exchange rate with the US dollar.   
Figure 1 depicts the movements of the domestic-currency real oil price, 
the nominal exchange rate, and the real exchange rate both with the US dollar 
for two floating currencies, the Japanese Yen and the German Mark.  We can 
see that, in general, there seems to be an association between movements in 
real oil prices and nominal and real exchange rates.    
Figure 3 depicts the same picture for two intermediate regime 
countries, Sweden and Korea.  Although, the nominal exchange rate is not 
allowed to float freely, we can see that there are casual associations between 
domestic-currency real oil prices and the nominal and real exchange rate with 
the US dollar.  One argument that attempts to explain this casual association 
assumes that the exchange rate of the dollar vis-à-vis other major currencies 
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might have influenced OPEC’s price decisions, Terzian (1985).  This is 
because the dollar depreciation against European or Japanese currencies 
makes goods denominated in those currencies more expensive, triggering 
OPEC to increase the price of oil in dollar terms to make up for the more 
expensive imports of OPEC members.   Yousefi and Wirjanto (2004) attempt 
to estimate the role of the nominal exchange rate in crude oil price formation.  
They find evidence that OPEC member countries’ prices react to changes in 
the exchange rate of the US dollar and prices of other members in setting their 
export prices.      
A second argument is that of the monetary policy reaction to oil price 
shocks, (Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (BGW, 1997)).  Focusing only on the 
US economy, BGW argue that monetary policy could be used to reduce any 
recessionary consequences of oil price shocks.  Thus, in the open economy 
context, holding other things constant, one can argue that a tightening of 
monetary policy (through an increase in the equivalence of the US federal 
funds rate) could result in currency appreciation against the US dollar, which 
will mitigate the adversary effects of oil price shocks.  In summary, this 
channel concentrates the effects of oil price shocks on the total US dollar bill 
paid by agents in a given country for oil imports.  
The second channel is an indirect channel in which oil price shocks 
affect the relative price between domestic and foreign goods, which in turn 
affects demand for domestically produced goods and domestic aggregate 
demand as well.  Since there is no reason to believe that the oil-price shocks 
are larger for fixed exchange rate regime countries than for flexible exchange 
rate regime countries, after controlling for the relevant factors, the difference 
will reflect the behavior of the real exchange rate under the two regimes.  
Given our discussion of the first direct channel, theory suggests that countries 
with more flexible exchange rate regimes are better able to adjust their real 
exchange rate in a way that helps reduce adjustment costs in terms of output.   
For fixed exchange rate regimes, the adjustment will be through prolonged 
movements in excess demand and labor markets that will eventually push 
nominal prices to equilibrium.    This channel operates after the work of the 
first channel.  When the nominal exchange rate changes, so does the real 
exchange rate, and hence, relative prices across countries.  In summary, this 
channel focuses on the adjustment in a country’s comparative advantage (or 
real exchange rate) as a result of oil price shocks. 
Finally, the third channel that is worth discussing is the role of 
expectations.  Producers in fixed exchange regime countries, particularly those 
with fixed regimes against the US dollar, such as currency boards, 
dollarization, or conventional pegs to the US dollar, will set prices differently 
from their counterparts in flexible exchange rate regime countries.  Producers 
in flexible exchange rate countries are worried about possible appreciations or 
depreciations of their currency against the dollar in addition to expected oil 
price hikes.  This argument has received good support in recent general 
equilibrium, new open economy models.  For example, Devereux and Engel 
(1998, 2003) show that that changes in the mark-up charged by a firm, due to 
monetary or productivity shocks, will differ across exchange rate regimes.  
Theory does not tell us if the above three channels reinforce or offset each 
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other.  This makes the investigation of the role of the exchange rate regime in 
the transmission of oil price shocks an empirical question, which this paper 
addresses. 
  
3. Data and Methodology 
 
We use a panel Vector Autoregression (panel VAR) model to study the impact 
of oil price shocks on the real exchange rate, the discount rate of the central 
bank, real output growth, and the inflation rate under alternative exchange rate 
regimes.  We use quarterly observations from 1973Q1 to 2004Q2 for nine 
major oil-importing countries: Japan, Germany, France, Italy, South Korea 
(Korea), Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Finland.  We use the Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) de facto exchange rate classification.   Data are obtained from 
the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, November 2004, published by 
the International Monetary Fund.  We also use the quarterly real wage rates 
published by the OECD.     
The variables included in the panel VAR model are:  real oil price 
shocks .),,( etcNOPIOPC , the bilateral real exchange rate index with the US 
)( itreri , a short-term interest rate )( itf , real output )( ity , and the consumer 
price index )( itcpi .  To control for factors other than the exchange rate regime 
that might affect the impact of oil price shocks on the economy, we include a 
set of conditioning (control) variables: the degree of openness 
)( itOPENN expressed as total exports and imports as a percentage of GDP in 
real terms, government spending )( itG  as a percentage of GDP in real terms, 
and the quarterly real wage rate ( itrw ).  All of the above variables are in logs 
except itOPENN , and itG .   
The short-term interest rate is included in the VAR to control for the 
reaction of monetary policy to oil price shocks (see section 2).  That is, we 
study the influence of oil price shocks on the macroeconomic variables when 
the effects of monetary policy are accounted for.  The degree of openness is a 
proxy of the proportion of traded goods and services in the economy, which 
might influence the degree of price adjustment.  To control for fiscal policy, 
we include government expenditures.  The real wage rate is used to account 
for changes in the marginal cost of producers.  The sources and definitions of 
all variables are provided in  
 
Table 1.   
Two important inputs to our empirical estimations are the classification 
of exchange rate regimes and the measure(s) of oil price shocks.  In practice, 
classifying a particular country as belonging to a certain exchange rate regime 
is rather difficult. This is due to the practice of the monetary authorities that 
try to move from the two polar cases in order to acquire as much as possible of 
what is referred in the literature as the “trinity”-independent monetary policy, 
free capital mobility, and a purely fixed exchange rate.  We use the Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) de facto classification of exchange rate regimes.   This 
classification is superior to other de facto classifications due to the use of 
 7
market-determined exchange rates (dual or parallel exchange rates), which 
systematically predict realignments in the official rate.  Table 2 reports the de 
facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff for the countries included in the 
sample. 
  Another important question that arises when analyzing oil price shocks 
in cross-country context is which proxy for these shocks is more robust?  
Previous studies that analyzed oil price shocks used the real price of oil (the 
US dollar price converted into the respective country’s currency and deflated 
by the GDP deflator or the CPI).  For our sample, we use the average spot oil 
price of Brent, Texas, and Dubai in US dollars converted to local currencies 
using the nominal exchange rate with the US dollar, and then deflated using 
the respective country’s CPI.  The literature provides multiple measures of oil 
price shocks.  One measure is the percentage change in the real oil price 
(OPCt).  We calculate this as 
1−−= ititit popoOPC  (1) 
where tpo is the log quarterly price of oil measured in US dollars, converted 
to local currency for each country using the nominal exchange rate with the 
US dollar and deflated using the consumer price index of the respective 
country.  This symmetric measure assumes a symmetric, linear relationship 
between oil price fluctuations and the economic variables under consideration, 
with increases and decreases in oil price having the same impacts on the 
economy.   
We also consider Hamilton’s net oil price increases (NOPI), which we 
calculate as   
( )( )[ ]4321 ,,,max,0max −−−−−= itititititit popopopopoNOPI  (2) 
where tpo is as defined above.  This measure is defined as the quarterly 
percentage change in real oil price from the past 4 quarters. Here, we take only 
positive oil price shocks.  The idea behind this measure is to capture the 
behavior of consumers and investors as they compare the price of oil this 
quarter to those in previous quarters (Hamilton 1996).  In our robustness check 
we extend this measure of shocks to include 8 quarters (2 years).    
 
Unit roots, cointegrations, and the choice of lags 
 
The individual (ADF) and panel (Levin and Lin, 1993) unit-root tests indicate 
that the log of the real exchange rate, the log of the short term interest rate, the 
log of real output, the log of the consumer price index, the log of the real wage 
rate, the degree of openness, and government expenditures are stationary in 
first differences only.  The pair-wise Kao cointegration tests could not reject 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  We therefore estimate the model in 
first differences.  We follow both standard statistical procedures and economic 
intuition (Hamilton et al (2004)) in selecting the lag length, which we set at 4 
lags. 3 
 
                                                 




Causality and exogeneity 
 
The literature on oil price shocks and the macroeconomy has long treated 
these shocks as exogenous, largely driven by political events.  Recently, 
Barsky and Kilian (2004) demonstrated that the idea of treating oil price 
shocks as purely exogenous is not robust, as it long seemed.  They show that a 
number of oil price shocks had not been preceded by any political turmoil.  To 
address this controversy formally, we perform Granger causality tests on the 
endogenous variables in our panel VAR model.  Results show (Table 3) that 
both the real exchange rate and the consumer price index Granger-cause real 
oil price shocks (using the NOPI definition).  These results are consistent with 
those reported by Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) for the Euro area, 
Japan, France, Italy, and Germany.  In addition, the results show that it is not 
safe to assume that the vector of the four endogenous variables, the real 
exchange rate index, the discount rate, real output growth and the inflation 
rate, does not Granger-cause the oil price shocks.  On the other hand, the 
results show that real oil price shocks Granger-cause the real exchange rate, 
real output growth, and the inflation rate at the 1% level of significance.     
   
Estimated model 
 
Given our earlier discussion, the econometric model takes the following form 
















,,,,Y , [ ]itititti GOPENNrw ∆∆∆= ,,,X , 
[ ]cpiityitfitreriitpotti uuuuu ,,,,, =′u  is the vector error term with zero mean and 
finite variance.  )A(L , and B(L)are nn× matrixes of polynomials in the 
backward-shift operator L.  To investigate whether oil price shocks have 
different effects under alternative exchange rate regimes, we split the sample 
according to the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto classification into three 
sub-samples corresponding to fixed, intermediate, and flexible exchange rate 
regimes and estimate the above model for each sub-sample.        
We choose to pool the individual VARs mainly to provide enough 
degrees of freedom, as we do not have enough observations for each exchange 
rate regime for individual countries included in the sample.  We should 
acknowledge the fact that using a panel VAR as opposed to individual VARs 
imposes the constraint that the response of different economies to oil price 
shocks is homogenous. In other words, we impose the assumption that the 
adjustment process is the same across the countries in our sample.  To increase 
the efficiency of the estimators, and to account for heterogeneity, we include 
both country fixed effects and time effects in the model.  We discuss this point 
further in the robustness section.  We also allow the variance of the error, u , 
to vary with “i”, the country.  In other words, we allow for cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity.      
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4. Results and Discussions 
Main results 
 
We first allow for a symmetric one period one standard deviation 
(approximately 10%) oil price shock using the difference in the log real price 
of oil as an oil price shock.  The impulse responses of the real exchange rate, 
the short-term rate, the real output growth, and the inflation rate are shown in 
Figure 34.  The impulse responses show that after a symmetric oil price shock, 
the real exchange rate depreciates instantaneously under flexible regimes 
while the adjustment under fixed regimes is prolonged.  The adjustments in 
the real exchange rate under flexible regimes are mostly driven by 
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate, at least for the quarter 
contemporaneous to the oil price shock when prices and wages are sluggish.  
After the contemporaneous depreciation, the real exchange rate returns to its 
long-run equilibrium relatively faster than its counterpart under a fixed 
exchange rate. The response of the real exchange rate under fixed regimes 
show an appreciation for the quarter contemporaneous to the oil price shock 
followed by periods of depreciation  then settling at its long-run equilibrium 
around the tenth quarter following the shock.  To analyze the behavior of the 
nominal exchange rate with the US dollar when allowed to float when there is 
an oil price shock, we estimate the following panel relationship for the flexible 


























The results are shown in Table 4.  The impulse response of the nominal 
exchange rate for countries adopting flexible exchange rate regimes to a 10% 
oil price shock using OPCit and NOPIit are shown in Figure 5.  Using either 
definition of the oil price shocks, the symmetric OPCit or the NOPIit, the 
results are almost identical.  The nominal exchange rate depreciates in the 
same period of the shock and then returns rapidly to its long-run equilibrium 
(for example, a 10% oil price shock using the NOPI definition causes, on 
average, 2% depreciation of the nominal exchange rate).   The impulse 
response of the nominal exchange rate resembles that of the real exchange 
rate, allowing us to conclude that the adjustment seen in the impulse response 
of the real exchange rate of countries under flexible exchange rate regimes are 
largely driven by depreciations in the nominal exchange rate, consistent with 
Friedman’s hypothesis.     
 The inflation impulse responses show that fixed regimes suffer higher 
inflation, due to oil price shocks, compared to flexible regimes.  This gives 
further support that adjustments to an oil price increase under fixed exchange 
rate regimes is driven merely by the adjustments in relative prices and wages 
since the nominal exchange rate is fixed.  The response of monetary policy 
(represented by the central bank’s discount rate) seems consistent across the 
                                                 
4 To contrast the two exchange rate regimes in terms of magnitude and speed of adjustment to 
oil price shocks, we show the quarterly dynamic responses not the cumulative responses of the 
endogenous variables.  
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regimes with more pronounced reaction under fixed regimes, due to the 
endogenity of monetary policy under the latter in order to maintain the fixed 
parity of the exchange rate.  For output growth, the flexible regime countries 
seem to suffer relatively more than fixed regimes.   
The empirical evidence in the literature suggests that the effects of oil 
price shocks are not symmetric, with oil price increases having significant 
effects on the economy and no effects from oil price decreases (e.g. Hamilton 
(1996, 2000), and Lee et al. (1995) for the US case and Mork (1994) and 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) for some OCED countries).  Given 
this, one should expect a sharper distinction in the response of the four 
aggregate variables, the real exchange rate, the discount rate, the real output 
growth, and the inflation rate to positive oil shocks when the latter are 
considered exclusively.   We re-estimate the model using the NOPIit instead of 
OPCit.  We find the response of the endogenous variables under different 
exchange regimes mainly the same, with more pronounced contrast for the real 
exchange rate and the short-term interest rate.  For the real exchange rates, 
although the initial response resembles that of symmetric oil price shocks, the 
real exchange rate under fixed regimes seems to suffer prolonged periods of 
depreciations before returning to its long-run equilibrium compared to flexible 
regimes.  For the short-term interest rate, the reaction of monetary policy to a 
positive oil price shock is also more pronounced under fixed exchange rate 
regimes.  As we indicate earlier, the monetary authority under fixed regimes 
tightens the monetary policy to reduce downward pressure on the exchange 
rate.    
 To test the statistical significance of the effects of oil price shocks on 
the endogenous variables in the panel VAR model under different exchange 
rate regimes, we conduct standard testing procedures (Table 5 and Table 6).  
We can see that oil price shocks are statistically significant only in affecting 
the real exchange rate across all exchange rate regimes.  The difference 
between the exchange rate regimes in reacting to an oil price shock is also 
statistically significant for the real exchange rate and the inflation rate across 




How important are oil price shocks in explaining short-term variations in the 
endogenous variables of our empirical VAR model?  To answer this question 
we perform standard variance decomposition exercises based on the four 
quarters ahead forecast shown in Table 7.  When using the symmetric 
definition of oil price shocks, they explain more than one third of the 
variations in the real exchange rate and the inflation rate for both fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes.  This is consistent with previous studies.  
Backus and Crucini (2000) found that oil prices account for much of the 
variations in the terms-of-trade for eight developed OECD countries.  Amano 
and Norden (1996) found that the domestic-currency real oil prices seem to 
capture significant long-run movements in the real effective exchange rates for 
Germany, Japan, and the United States.   
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Caveats and robustness check 
 
How robust are the findings of our estimations in this paper?  We will answer 
this question by addressing the following caveats.  The first important caveat 
is that the varying responses to the oil price shocks might come from the 
different economic structures in the countries included in the sample and not 
necessarily from the exchange rate regime adopted by the group of countries. 
We can partly relax this caveat first given the fact that the sample we choose is 
that of nine oil-importing OECD countries in which the importance of oil is 
proportional to the size of the economy.   In addition, the set of control 
variables (country effects, time effects, real wage rate, degree of openness and 
government expenditures) reduces the effects of those other factors other than 
the exchange rate regime. 
 The second caveat is the choice of the exchange rate regime 
classification.  Although our estimations are based on the de facto exchange 
rate regime classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), for the countries 
included in our sample, this classification is highly correlated with the de facto 
classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).  The Reinhart and 
Rogoff classification is empirically more appealing due the fact that countries 
less frequently switch among regimes in this classification compared to that of 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger.  The correlation of the Reinhart and Rogoff 
classification with the de jure classification of the IMF is very low.  In this 
case, validating our results with the IMF classification will not be 
meaningful.5   The third caveat is the choice of the proxy for oil price shocks.  
We found that using the NOPI measure gives slightly more significant results 
compared to the positive changes of OPC measure.  We also extended NOPI 
to include 8 lags (2 years), and the results were qualitatively similar to those of 
4 lags (one year), but less significant.    
 A fourth caveat is the stability of the relationship between the measure 
of the oil price shocks and the economic variable under consideration.  In the 
empirical literature, the relationship between the oil price shocks and real GDP 
was found to be less stable across the last three decades (e.g. Hamilton 2000).  
The major argument in the literature to support such instability is the collapse 
of OPEC around 1986 when it failed to act as a cartel.  However, in this study, 
the degrees of freedom is the major restriction in validating the results of the 
estimations across different time periods.  Nonetheless, we argue that using 
the NOPI measure (extended to longer lags) will reduce any instability in the 
parameters, given the nonlinearity of this measure.  However, our objective is 
to analyze the role of the exchange rate regimes in the adjustments to oil price 
shocks, which take effect in the short-to-medium term, rather than focusing on 
possible long-run stable relationships between the oil price and the 




                                                 




Monetary policy and oil price shocks 
 
In this section, we revisit the point we have briefly introduced in this paper 
regarding the debate on whether only oil price shocks should be blamed for 
the recession usually found after these shocks or whether the contractionary 
monetary policy reacting to the high oil prices contributes to the recession.  
We address this issue formally by re-estimating the empirical model without 
accounting for the monetary policy variable (the discount rate) to see if the 
responses of the endogenous variables are any different than if monetary 
policy is accounted for.  Figure 4 shows the impulse response of the real 
exchange rate, the output growth rate, and the inflation rate to a 10% positive 
oil price shock using NOPI measure of shocks.  Except for the inflation rate 
under fixed regimes, the responses are almost the same as when the short-term 
interest rate is accounted for.  The inflation rate seems to be lower when 
ignoring monetary policy under fixed regimes compared to the case when 
monetary policy is accounted for.  This might suggest that monetary policy 
helps reduce inflationary pressure triggered by oil price shocks under fixed 
regimes.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The recurring oil price shocks that hit all economies in the world provide an 
opportunity to empirically test Friedman’s hypothesis that flexible regimes 
better absorb real external shocks.  The uncertainty associated with the size 
and timing of these shocks has certainly contributed, directly and indirectly, to 
the search, choice, and design of robust monetary and exchange rate systems 
that might facilitate the absorption of these shocks.  In this paper, we 
empirically tackle the issue of the role of exchange rate regimes in affecting 
the responses of some key economic variables to oil price shocks.  We use a 
panel VAR technique, with minimal restrictions, to test for the impact of oil 
price shocks on nine major OECD oil-importing countries under alternative 
exchange rate regimes using Reinhart and Rogoff de facto classification 
scheme, after controlling for other factors that might affect the responsiveness 
to oil price shocks.  We find that flexible exchange rate regimes better absorb 
positive oil price shocks, consistent with Friedman’s hypothesis.  The 
necessary adjustments are made by the nominal exchange rate mostly in the 
same period of the oil price shocks.  We find that under flexible exchange rate 
regimes, and in response to one standard deviation oil price shock, the real 
exchange rate, the short-term interest rate  and the inflation rate show lower 
magnitude and faster speed of adjustment when returning to their long-run 
equilibrium relative to the fixed exchange rate regimes.  Our analyses show 
that monetary policy helps reduce inflationary pressure triggered by oil price 
shocks under fixed regimes only.   These findings have policy implications for 
emerging economies as they experience a growing industrial sector and more 




Amano, R., and Van Norden, S. (1996) Exchange rates and oil prices, Bank of 
Canada, Working Paper. 
 
Backus, D., and Crucini, M. (2000) ‘Oil prices and the terms-of-trade’, Journal of 
International Economics, 50, 185-213. 
 
Barsky, R. , and Killian, L. (2004) ‘Oil and the macroeconomy since the 1970s’,  
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(4), 115-134. 
 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and Watson, M. (1997) ‘Systematic monetary policy and 
the effects of oil price shocks’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, I, 91-157. 
 
Broda, C. (2004) ‘Terms-of-trade and exchange rate regimes in developing 
countries’, Journal of International Economics, 63(1), 31-58. 
 
Devereux, M., and Engel, C. (1998) Fixed versus floating exchange rates: how price 
setting affects the optimal choice of exchange rate regime, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper, No. 6867.  
 
------------------------------------- (2003) ‘Monetary policy in the open economy 
revisited: price setting and exchange rate flexibility’, The Review of Economic 
Studies, 70, 765-785,  and National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 
No. 7665. 
 
Edwards, S., and Levy-Yeyati, E. (2003) Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 9867. 
 
Engel, C. (1999) ‘Accounting for U.S. real exchange rate changes’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 107, 507-538. 
 
------------- (2000) ‘Local-currency pricing and the choice of exchange-rate regime’, 
European Economic Review, 44, 1149-1472. 
 
Engel C. (2002) The responsiveness of consumer prices to exchange rates and the 
implication for exchange rate policy: a survey of a few recent new open economy 
macro models, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 8725. 
 
Engel, C., and Rogers, J. (1996) ‘How wide is the border?, American Economic 
Review’, 86, 1112-1125. 
 
--------------------------------- (2001) ‘Deviations from the purchasing power parity: 
causes and welfare costs’, Journal of International Economics, 55, 29-57. 
 
Friedman, M. (1953) The case for flexible exchange rates, in essays in positive 
economics, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A., Ostry, J., and Wolf, H. (1997) Does the nominal exchange rate 
regime matter? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 5874. 
 
Hamilton, J. (1996) ‘This is what happened to the oil price–macroeconomy 
relationship’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 38, 215–220. 
 14
 
---------------- (2000) What is an oil shock?, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper, No. 7755. 
 
Hamilton, J., and Herrera, A. (2004) ‘Oil shocks and aggregate macroeconomic 
behavior: the role of monetary policy, a comment’, Journal of Money, Credit, And 
Banking, 36, No.2. 
 
Jiménez-Rodríguez, R., and Sánchez, M. (2005) ‘Oil price shocks and real GDP 
growth: empirical evidence for some OECD countries’, Applied Economics, 37, 201-
228.  
 
Jones, D., Leiby, P., and Paik, I. (2004) ‘Oil price shocks and the macroeconomy: 
what has been learned since 1996’, Energy Journal, 25, No.2. 
 
Kao, C. (1999) ‘Spurious regression and residual based tests for cointegration in 
panel data’, Journal of Econometrics, 90, 1– 44. 
 
Lee, K.., Ni, S., and Ratti, R.A. (1995) ‘Oil shocks and the macroeconomy: the role 
of price variability’, Energy Journal, 16, 39–56. 
 
Levin, A., and Lin, C. (1993) Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite 
sample properties, revised edition, Discussion Paper No. 92-93. Department of 
Economics, University of California at San Diego. 
 
Levy Yeyati, E., and Sturzenegger, F. (2002) Classifying exchange rate regimes: 
deeds vs. words, Mimeo. 
 
Mork, K. (1994) ‘Business cycles and the oil market’, Energy Journal, 15, 15–38. 
 
Mussa, M. (1986) Nominal exchange rate regimes and the behavior of the real 
exchange rate, In: Brunner, K., Meltzer, A. (Eds.), Real Business Cycles, Real 
Exchange Rates and Actual Policies. North-Holland, New York, 117– 213. 
 
Obstfeld, M., and Rogoff, K. (1998) Risk and exchange rates, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper, No. 6694. 
 
Pedroni, P. (1995) Panel cointegration: asymptotic and finite sample properties of 
pooled time series tests with an application to the ppp hypothesis, Indiana University 
Working Papers, No. 95-013 (forthcoming in Econometric Theory). 
 
Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K. (2004) ‘The modern history of exchange rate 
arrangements: a reinterpretation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. CXIX, Issue 
1, February. 
 
Terzian, P. (1985) OPEC: the inside story, Zed Books, London. 
 
Yousefi, A., and Wirjanto, T. (2004) ‘The empirical role of the exchange rate on the 




Table 1: Data sources and definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Real oil price )( tpo  The average spot oil price of Brent, Taxes, and Dubai in US dollars converted to local currencies using the nominal exchange rate with the 
US dollar, and then deflated with the respective country’s CPI. 
Bilateral real exchange rate with 
the US dollar )( itreri , 
Calculated as the bilateral nominal exchange rate with the US dollar 
adjusted by the relative consumer price indices, expressed as an index, 
not seasonally adjusted.  
Real output )( ity , Nominal GDP in respective currencies divided by GDP deflator, expressed as an index, not seasonally adjusted. 
Consumer price index )( itcpi .    Published by the IMF, not seasonally adjusted. 
The central bank’s discount 
rate )( itf , 
The discount rate under the direct control of monetary authorities (the 
name may vary from country to country- we use the 3-month treasury 
bond if discount rate is not available). not seasonally adjusted. 
Real wage rate ( itrw ) Published by the OECD, seasonally adjusted.  
Degree of openness )( itOPENN , Real imports plus real exports divided by real GDP, not seasonally adjusted. 




Table 2: Counties included in the sample along with their 
Reinhart and Rogoff de facto exchange rate regime classification 
for the sample period 
 
 Exchange rate regime 
Country Fixed Flexible Intermediate 
Finland 1995-1998  1974-1994 
France 1987-1998  1973-1986 
Germany  1973-1998  
Italy 1997-1998  1973-1996 
Japan  1978-2004 1973-1977 
Korea 1974-1979 1998-2004 1973, 1980-1997 
Portugal 1994-1998  1973-1993 
Spain 1973, 1994-1998  1974-1993 
Sweden   1973-2004 




Table 3: Granger Causality Test between oil price shocks and other variables 
in the VAR system based on p=4 lags 
 
Causality Hypothesis b p-value a 
Real exchange rate 
Gr




→ oil price shocks 
0.697 
Real output growth 
Gr




→ oil price shocks 
0.015 
All four variables 
Gr
→ oil price shocks 
0.000 
Oil price shocks 
Gr
→ real exchange rate  
0.019 
Oil price shocks 
Gr
→ discount rate 
0.367 
Oil price shocks 
Gr
→ real output growth  
0.012 




Oil price shocks 
Gr
→ All four variables 
0.001 
a the lowest significant level at which we can reject the null hypothesis 






Table 4: The impact of oil shocks on the nominal exchange rate for 
countries under flexible exchange rate regimes 
 
 Using OPC Using NOPI 




















1, −∆ tineri  0.318 (0.065) 
0.330 
(0.065) 
2, −∆ tineri  -0.206 (0.067) 
-0.185 
(0.067) 
3, −∆ tineri  0.193 (0.065) 
0.193 
(0.067) 
4, −∆ tineri  -0.014 (0.065) 
-0.042 
(0.065) 
R-squared 0.255 0.170 




Table 5: Hypothesis testing of the significance of oil price shocks across 
different regimes 
 
Variable Fixed Flexible Intermediate 
Real exchange rate 3.92** 2.33* 4.38** 
Discount rate 0.21 2.35* 0.58 
Real output growth 0.27 0.59 0.86 
Inflation rate 0.88 1.08 3.06** 
Notes: (1) values are the F-value of testing the hypothesis that coefficients are zero in all 






































Inflation rate 1.90 6.64** 1.42 3.62* 
Notes: (1) values are the F-value of testing the hypothesis that coefficients are equal.  (2) +, *,  and ** refer 




Table 7: Variance Decomposition: Proportion of variance explained by the 







Symmetric Oil Price shocks    
                            Fixed 15  33 
                            Flexible 42  39 
                            Intermediate 43  3 




Japan (all variables in logs, 2000=100) 
 
Germany (all variables in logs, 1995=100) 
 
Figure 1: The domestic-currency real price of oil, the nominal exchange rate, and the real 
exchange rate for flexible exchange rate regime countries 
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Sweden (all variables in logs, 2000=100) 
Korea (all variables in logs, 2000=100) 
 
Figure 2: The domestic-currency real price of oil, the nominal exchange rate, and the real 
exchange rate for intermediate exchange rate regime countries 
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Figure 4: The impulse responses to a 10% oil price shock (using NOPI) without 












Note: dotted lines are two standard deviations confidence interval 
 
Figure 5: The impulse response of the nominal exchange rate to 
10% oil price shocks for flexible regime countries 
 
 
 
